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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(2008). The supreme courthad jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008). 
The Judgment was entered February 20, 2008,2 and an Amended Judgment entered March 
4, 2008.3 The Notice of Appeal was timely filed March 5,2008. 
2Record 1184-82. Because the documents in the trial court record are organized in reverse 
chronological order, the pagination for appeal on each document is in reverse order. 
3Record 1192-90. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that a confidential relationship existed 
between a step-mother and her step-children where there were no findings and no evidence 
to support that conclusion? 
"[Wjhether the trial court's findings of fact in support of [an issue] are sufficient is 
also a question of law, reviewed for correctness."4 Although labeled as a conclusion, the 
determination that a confidential relationship existed is more akin to a finding. The 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding may be reviewed on appeal without having 
been raised below.5 In addition, Stout did object to the resulting decision based on a 
constructive trust.6 
2. Where the trial court denied leave to amend a pleading to add a constructive 
trust claim, was it error to thereafter award judgment based on a finding of constructive trust? 
A party's "claim that the trial court erred in entering judgment against him on a theory 
not raised by the pleadings involves a conclusion of law that we review under a 
correction-of-error standard."7 Stout raised this issue in his Motion to Amend the Judgment 
and Request for a New Trial.8 
3. Where a personal representative was entitled to property as her intestate share 
under the statutes in effect at the time she transferred the property to herself, can a later 
statutory amendment render the transfer improper? 
^Selvage v. 11 lohnson &Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
5UtahR.Civ.P. 52(b). 
6Record 1137-36. 
"Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, % 31, 137 P.3d 1224, 1230. 
8The motion is at Record 1132-31, and the supporting memorandum at Record 1138-33. 
2 
Determining which version of a statute applies is a matter of statutory interpretation 
which is reviewed for correctness.9 This issue was raised by Stout's Motion in Limine 
Regarding Intestacy Statutes,10 among other places. 
4. If a constructive trust was proper, was it error to award the petitioners the home 
outright without requiring an adjustment for increased equity resulting from the title-holder 
discharging the mortgage against the house? 
"We can reverse the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust only for an abuse 
of discretion. This court will only conclude the trial court abused its discretion if the ruling 
was beyond the limits of reasonability."11 This issue was raised in closing arguments.12 
5. Where an asset was transferred in 1993, did the statute of limitations13 bar a 
petition filed in 2005 seeking to set aside the transfer? 
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or 
denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."14 The 
determination of whether the trial court properly concluded that the statute of limitations 
expired to bar [an] action is a question of law that we review for correctness."15 This issue 
9TM. v. State, 2003 UT App 191,% 9, 73 P.3d 959, 962. 
10The motion is at Record 1013-12, and the supporting memorandum at Record 1018-14. 
nTolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 
12Transcript 11/14/07 at 376. 
13Currently codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307. 
l4Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
l5Dep't of Natural Resources v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, f 11, 
52 P.3d 1257, 1260. 
3 
was raised below in Stout's motion for summary judgment16 and in Stout's Post-Trial 
Memorandum.17 
6. Where a petition in a probate matter sought to set aside a property transfer and 
to then account and distribute the asset according to the probate statutes, did the trial court 
err by instead awarding the asset directly to the petitioners without treating it as an asset of 
the probate estate? 
A party's "claim that the trial court erred in entering judgment against him on a theory 
not raised by the pleadings involves a conclusion of law that we review under a 
correction-of-error standard."18 Stout raised this issue in his Motion to Amend the Judgment 
and Request for a New Trial.19 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The 1993 (time of the questioned transaction) and 2007 (time of trial) versions of the 
relevant statutes are presented in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a probate case. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On June 10,1993, Ellen LeFevre, the widow of Harold LeFevre, filed an application 
for informal appointment of personal representative in order to probate the estate of Harold 
LeFevre, who died intestate on March 19,1993.20 Waivers of notice were filed by Harold's 
16Record 619-511. 
17Record 1098-1088. 
nCowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, \ 31, 137 P.3d 1224, 1230. 
19The motion is at Record 1132-31, and the supporting memorandum at Record 1138-33. 
20Record3-l. 
4 
children21 and letters testamentary were issued appointing Ellen LeFevre as personal 
representative.22 No further action occurred in a probate action until February 28, 2005, 
when the LeFevre children23 filed their Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative's 
Transfers from Decedent's Estate.24 In a supporting memorandum, the LeFevre children 
alleged that a house on Canyon Road in Provo had been improperly transferred from the 
estate to Ellen LeFevre's trust, and requested that the transfer be set aside, a new personal 
representative appointed, and the estate distributed to the heirs.25 Leland Stout, who 
identified his interest as "the rightful transferor/heir of the property subject to the Petition," 
filed an objection to the petition.26 
On March 29,1995, a separate informal proceeding was commenced with respect to 
the estate of Edith K. LeFevre, the former wife of Harold LeFevre. The matters were 
consolidated by order entered September 21, 2005.27 
On October 31, 2006, Leland Stout filed a motion for summary judgment asserting 
the claims of the LeFevre children were barred by the statute of limitations and the statute 
21Record 20-14. 
22Record 25. 
23Harold R. LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel LeFevre, 
Bryce LeFevre, and Cynthia C. L. Giles. 
24Record 29-28. 
25Record 34-30. 
26Record 91-76. 
27Record 117-15. 
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of frauds. By ruling entered March 26,2007, the trial court concluded there were issues of 
fact and denied the motion.29 
The case was scheduled for trial on November 13-14,2007.30 On October 30, 2007, 
the LeFevre children filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum in Support of Petition 
to Set Aside Personal Representative's Transfers from Decedent's Estate31 and a supporting 
memorandum,32 seeking to add a constructive trust claim. The trial court denied the motion 
by oral ruling at the beginning of trial.33 
Following trial, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision finding the issues in 
favor of the LeFevre children based on a constructive trust theory, and ordering that the 
Canyon Road home be conveyed to the LeFevre children.34 The formal Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law35 and a judgment36 were entered February 20, 2008. An Amended 
Judgment, adding a judgment for costs, was entered March 4, 2008.37 
28Through apparent clerical error, the actual motion does not appear the court file. The 
Memorandum in Support of Respondent Leland E. Stout's Motion for Summary Judgment 
appears in the court file at Record 619-509. 
29Record 798-96. 
30Record 816-13. 
31
 Record 818-17. 
32Record 986-819. 
33Transcript 11/13/97 at 21. 
34Record 1119-11. 
35Record 1181-72. 
36Record 1184-82. 
37Record 1192-90. 
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C. Statement of Facts.38 
After the death of his wife Edith, Harold LeFevre married Ellen Stout and they lived 
in a home titled in Harold's name.39 The trial court found that after Harold died in March 
1993, Ellen met with the LeFevre children following Harold's funeral, stated that any debts 
they owed to Harold were forgiven, and asked if the LeFevre children would allow her to 
stay in the home for the remainder of her life.40 Ellen told the LeFevre children that the home 
would be placed in a trust, and that at her death the home and Harold's estate would go to the 
LeFevre children and Ellen's property and estate would go to her children.41 Ellen placed the 
home in a trust in April 1993, initially providing that the LeFevre children would receive 
50% of the distributions and the Stout children 50%.42 She amended the trust in 1994 to 
provide that each of the LeFevre and Stout children would have equal shares as beneficiaries 
of the trust.43 In September 1995 she amended the trust to eliminate any distribution to the 
LeFevre children beyond a gift of a home in Provo.44 
38Because Stout is not directly challenging the trial court's findings in this appeal, many 
of the fact below will be supported by citation to the findings rather than to the transcript. 
39Record 1180^3 ,4 ,7 . 
40Record 1180-79 fflf 10-14. Stout presented evidence that no meeting or agreement ever 
occurred. E.g., Transcript 11/14/07 at 322, 325, 332-33. 
4 1Recordll79t 15. 
42Record 1179-78 fflf 20-21; Exhibit 1 Tab 6. Although the trial court found this 
distribution was a material difference from that proposed at the post-funeral meeting, Hal 
LeFevre testified this distribution was "essentially in the spirit of what was discussed." 
Transcript 11/13/07 p. 89. 
43Exhibit 1 Tab 7. 
44Exhibit 1 Tab 8. 
7 
In May 1995, Ellen sold a rental house in Provo and distributed the proceeds to the 
LeFevre children.45 In making the distributions, Ellen deducted for loans the children had 
received from Harold.46 Daniel LeFevre objected to the deduction as being contrary to 
Ellen's oral agreement following Harold's funeral, but took no action to challenge it.47 
Ellen passed away October 28, 2004.48 Following her death the LeFevre children 
obtained a copy of her trust from the attorney who had represented both Ellen and Harold.49 
They thereafter brought this action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the commencement of trial, the trial court denied the petitioners' last-minute 
motion seeking leave to amend their petition to allege a constructive trust. The trial court 
properly held that the motion was too late and prejudicial. The trial court's ruling following 
trial, however, granted relief based on that same constructive trust theory that had been 
precluded. Where the claim had not been pleaded, it was error to grant relief based on that 
claim. 
A more fundamental error in the constructive trust ruling, however, was the 
conclusion/finding that a confidential relationship existed between the parties. The trial court 
held that such a relationship existed, but there were no factual findings to support that 
conclusion. And, nothing in the underlying evidence would have supported a finding that 
'E.g., Exhibit 2 Tabs 15-21; Transcript 11/13/07 at 93, 147. 
Transcript 11/13/07 at 147. 
JId. at 149, 156. 
'Exhibit 1 Tab 81. 
'Transcript 11/13/07 at 57-58. 
8 
the stepmother was in a superior position such that she was able to impose her will on the 
stepchildren. 
Another error in the constructive trust ruling is that in determining whether there was 
an inequity or unjust enrichment, the trial court applied amendments to the probate code that 
were not enacted until five years after the transaction in question. The amendments were 
substantive, and could not be given retroactive effect. 
The petitioners' action was brought nearly twelve years after the challenged 
transaction. The trial court denied a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of 
limitations, finding there were disputed factual issues, but after trial did not make any 
findings resolving those factual issues. This court should hold as a matter of law that the 
petitioners had notice sufficient to create a duty to inquire further, and their claims are barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
Finally, even though the relief sought by the petitioners was an order setting aside the 
transfer and then including it in the probate estate, the trial court instead ordered the property 
conveyed directly to the petitioners. The trial court failed to make any findings as to whether 
the petitioners would have been entitled to their property in a proper distribution from the 
estate. If voiding the transfer is upheld, then it was still error to not return the property to the 
probate estate or to determine the appropriate distribution from the estate. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
I: NO CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN 
ELLEN LEFEVRE AND HER STEP-CHILDREN, ALL OF 
WHOM WERE INDEPENDENT ADULTS. 
The trial court held that the subject house was held in a constructive trust for the 
benefit of the LeFevre children. A foundational prerequisite for this holding was the trial 
court's conclusion that "Ellen held a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the LeFevre 
children when they permitted her by common consent to place the home in her trust."50 
Indeed, case authority confirms that the finding of a confidential or fiduciary relationship is 
a prerequisite for finding a constructive trust.51 There are no findings explicitly supporting 
the conclusion that a confidential relationship existed. The only findings that are even 
relevant are the following: "Bryce LeFevre stayed at the Home while he was in Provo for the 
funeral."52 "Months after the funeral, Hal took Ellen on a vacation with his family."53 
"Bryce continued to visit Ellen throughout the years and had a good relationship with her."54 
"Steve Skabelund, Ellen's attorney, testified that in 1995 all he observed was a good 
relationship between Ellen and the LeFevre children. In fact, he was not aware of any 
contention between Ellen and the LeFevre children until this action."55 
The evidence in the case is similarly inadequate. The evidence most supportive of a 
close relationship between the parties (in addition to the findings above) is marshalled as 
follows: The Stout and LeFevre children kind of grew up together and played together as 
50Findings p. 8 % 6. 
5lSee Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co,, 87 Utah 364, 368, 49 P.2d 403, 404 (1935). 
52Record 1180f 9. 
53Record 1179^19. 
54Recordll781J26. 
55Record 11751J 37. 
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children.56 The post-funeral meeting with between Ellen and the LeFevre children was 
cordial.57 For about four or five months after the funeral, Daniel LeFevre called Ellen about 
once a month to inquire how she was doing.58 Ellen is buried next to Harold.59 Bryce 
LeFevre would stay at the home of Harold and Ellen when he visited.60 
As a matter of law, this evidence is not sufficient to support a conclusion that a 
confidential relationship existed. The elements and attributes of a confidential relationship 
were summarized by this Court in In re Estate of Jones:61 
The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the 
principle of inequality between the parties and implies a position 
of superiority occupied by one of the parties over another. 
However, the mere relationship of parent and child does not 
constitute evidence of such confidential relationship as to create 
a presumption of undue influence. 
While kinship may be a factor in determining the 
existence of a legally significant confidential relationship, there 
must be a showing, in addition to the kinship, a reposal of 
confidence by one party and the resulting superiority and 
influence on the other party Mere confidence in one person 
by another is not sufficient alone to constitute such a 
relationship.62 
In Bradbury v. Rasrnussen,63 the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
56Transcript 11/13/07 at 37-38. 
51
 Id. at 40, 137 
5
*Id. at 142, 157. 
59Id. at 172. 
60Id. at 196-96. 
6l759 P.2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
62Id. at 347-48 (citations and indenting of quotation omitted). The second paragraph is 
a quotation from Bradbury v. Rasrnussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 383, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965). 
6316 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965). 
11 
The relationship must be such as would lead an ordinarily 
prudent person in the management of his business affairs to 
repose that degree of confidence in the other party which largely 
results in the substitution of the will of the latter for that of the 
former in the material matters involved in the transaction. The 
doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of 
inequality between the parties, and implies a position of 
superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other. . . . 
[I]t must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there is 
superior influence on one side and dependence on the other.64 
Application of these principles was illustrated in In re Estate of loupe.65 The 
decedent, Dale loupe, suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and had been rated by the 
Veterans Administration as incompetent to handle his own affairs.66 The decedent's 
biological sister, Angela, periodically visited the decedent and on one of those occasions took 
the decedent to an agent who prepared a will naming Angela as the sole beneficiary of his 
estate.67 The decedent's adoptive family (Montes) challenged the validity of the will, 
claiming lack of testamentary capacity and indue influence. Addressing the claim of undue 
influence, this Court quoted the statement from Jones that mere confidence or kinship is not 
sufficient to constitute such a relationship,68 and concluded: 
The Monteses have made no such showing regarding the 
decedentfs relationship with his natural sister. In fact, they do 
little more than assert that because Angela was the decedent*s 
sister, a confidential relationship existed. Such a conclusion is 
contrary to Jones. Moreover, a determination of undue 
influence is not borne out by the evidence in this case. The 
Montes family has not established that Angela overpowered 
64 
65 
[Id. at 383, 401 P.2d at 713 (italics added). 
878 P.2d 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
66/</.atll70. 
61
 Id. at 1170-71. 
687tf.atll74. 
12 
Dale's volition, thereby imposing her own desires in the making 
of his will.69 
The findings and evidence in this case simply will not support a conclusion of a 
confidential relationship. Proof must be by clear and convincing evidence.70 While the 
LeFevre children testified that they trusted Ellen, "mere confidence" does not create a 
confidential relationship. The LeFevre children were stepchildren. While the court found 
on disputed evidence that they had a good relationship with Ellen, there was no proof of any 
superiority of Ellen over the LeFevre children. There was no proof they ever resided in her 
home or stayed there for any significant length of time. At the time of the events in question, 
all were adults, most with families. For example, Hal, the oldest LeFevre child, was an 
entrepreneur with an engineering degree and post-graduate education who had lived out of 
state for several years.71 Daniel, the third child, had moved out of state in 1989, four years 
before Harold's death in 1993.72 Bryce, who had the closest relationship with Ellen,73 had 
moved out of state in 1987 and visited "at least annually,"74 but did not testify to any 
overpowering actions by Ellen, only that he believed her.75 There is no hint in the evidence 
of any unequal relationship with Ellen occupying a superior position such that she was able 
to impose her will on the LeFevre children. This court must hold that there was no evidence 
69Id. at 1174 (paragraph structure omitted). 
10SeeAshton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147,151 (Utah 1987); Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 
511, 513 (Utah 1976). 
7ITranscript 11/13/07 at 37. 
72Transcript 11/13/07 at 136. 
73Transcript 11/13/07 at 199. 
74Transcript 11/13/07 at 195-96. 
75Transcript 11/13/07 at 213. 
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showing a confidential relationship in this case, and should reverse the conclusion that a 
confidential relationship existed. 
II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JUDGMENT 
BASED ON A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST THEORY. 
A. The Constructive Trust Theory Was Not Pleaded, 
The trial court awarded judgment for the LeFevre children based on a theory of 
constructive trust. This constructive trust theory was never pleaded, and it was improper to 
awarded judgment based on this theory. 
It is important to understand the procedural context in which this case arises. The 
LeFevre children filed a Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative's Transfers From 
Decedent's Estate76 in the Harold LeFevre probate action, seeking to set aside Ellen's 1993 
transfer of the home from the probate estate to her trust. In the memorandum supporting 
their petition, the LeFevre children argued that the "transfer was improper because it violated 
Utah's probate statutes."77 The relief sought, as stated in the memorandum, was that the court 
should unwind the transfer, appoint a new personal representative of Harold's estate, "and 
require said new personal representative to account for Decedent's estate, and distribute its 
assets, to the satisfaction of the remaining heirs."78 
Nowhere in the petition or the supporting memorandum is there any mention of the 
concept of a "constructive trust." This is not mere semantics. The nature of a constructive 
trust claim is very different from the petition to set aside that was filed by the LeFevre 
children. A petition to set aside was properly filed in a probate action, and sought the return 
of the property to the probate of estate, with the eventual distribution according to the probate 
'Record 29. 
'Record 31. 
;Record 30. 
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statutes. A constructive trust suit, in contrast, would not involve the probate estate. Under 
the LeFevre children's constructive trust theory, the transfer of the property from the estate 
to the trust was completely proper and expected; it was only the terms of the trust and the 
subsequent amendments of the trust that were a concern. A constructive trust suit would be 
a new proceeding against the person or entity holding legal title to the property, and claiming 
that title was held on behalf of the alleged beneficiaries of a constructive trust. 
Because the constructive trust theory was not properly cognizable in this probate 
action, and because the theory was never pleaded, it was error for the trial court to award 
judgment based on that theory. 
B. The Propriety of a Transfer from a Probate Estate must Be Evaluated 
by the Laws in Effect at the Time of the Transfer, Not by Later Amendments to the Probate 
Code. 
The petition filed by the LeFevre children sought to set aside the transfer of the 
decedent's home to a trust created by his widow. In arguing that the transfer created an 
inequity, the LeFevre children asserted that the value of Harold's estate was $397,000 and 
that they received only 2.5% of Harold's assets.79 Not only were those numbers disputed,80 
they were based on the version of the probate code enacted in 1998, years after the 
transaction in question. A constructive trust may be imposed only where there is unjust 
enrichment,81 so the value of the probate estate was relevant. Therefore, a primary issue in 
this case was whether the LeFevre's petition would be judged by the statutes in effect at the 
time of the transfer or those in effect at the time of trial. 
When Harold died in 1993, the intestate share of the surviving spouse (where there 
were issue of the decedent who were not issue of the surviving spouse) was one-half the 
79Transcript 11/14/07 at 352, 357, 368. 
*°See Exhibit 2 Tab 1. 
uSeeAshton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
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probate estate.82 The rule was changed by amendment in 1998 to provide that the intestate 
share of the surviving spouse was the first $50,000 plus half the balance.83 More critically, 
the 1998 amendment also stated that all nonprobate transfers as defined by statute would be 
considered in determining whether the surviving spouse was entitled to any additional share 
from the estate.84 
Relying on Utah Code § 75-8-101 (2)(b), the trial court held that the validity of the 
1993 transfer, and damages from any breach of the oral agreement, would be determined 
based on the laws in effect at the time of trial in 2007. Section 75-8-101(2)(b) states: 
The code applies to any proceedings in court then 
pending or thereafter commenced regardless of the time of the 
death of decedent except to the extent that in the opinion of the 
court the former procedure should be made applicable in a 
particular case in the interest of justice or because of 
infeasibility of application of the procedure of this code. 
There are several reasons why section 75-8-101 does not authorize retroactive 
application of the 1998 amendments. 
Statutes are not retroactive unless the legislature expressly so provides.85 Retroactivity 
of substantive laws "is not favored in the law."86 There was no express declaration of 
retroactivity for the 1998 amendments to the probate code. The 1998 amendments were 
enacted by Senate Bill 75.87 Section 104 of that bill states: "This act takes effect on July 1, 
82Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102 (repealed by L. 1998, ch 39, § 10) (copy in appendix). 
83Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102 (2008) (copy in appendix). 
84Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-206 (enacted by L. 1998, ch. 39, § 28) (copy in appendix). The 
statute was amended again in 2008. 
85Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3. 
**B.AM Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, If 20, 128 P.3d 1161, 1167. 
87UtahLawsl998,ch.39. 
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1998." It is apparent, therefore, that § 75-8-101 refers to application of the entire probate 
code as a whole as it existed when § 75-8-101 was enacted, but not to the 1998 amendments. 
An additional reason why the 1998 amendments are not relevant in determining the 
effect of the 1993 transfer is that section 75-8-101, by its terms, applies only to procedural 
provisions of the probate code. The law is well established in Utah that procedural 
enactments may be given retroactive application, whereas substantive provisions cannot be 
given retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly so provides.88 Construing the 
substantially identical language of the Maine statute, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held: 
"Subsection (b)(2) is by its terms only applicable to the code's procedural rules, not its 
substantive rules."89 The Montana Supreme Court similarly held: "By this language, the 
legislature intended the procedural rules of the U.P.C. should apply to any probate 
proceeding pending or commenced after July 1,1975. The substantive rules of the U.P.C. are 
not given retroactive or retrospective effect, but only apply to the wills of decedents dying 
after July 1, 1975."90 Consistent with these cases, the Utah Supreme Court held that a trial 
court properly did not apply the new code to determine liability for property taxes where 
"title to [the decedent's] property had passed to her heirs more than a year prior to the 
effective date of our new probate code."91 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the issue before the trial court here was not 
what distribution should have been made in 2007, but whether the actions of Ellen LeFevre 
in 1993 were proper. In determining whether the LeFevre children were damaged by the 
Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 953 P.2d 435,437-38 
(Utah 1997). 
%9Scribner v. Berry, 489 A.2d 8, 9 (Me. 1985). 
90In re Estate ofGudmunsen, 545 P.2d 146, 149 (Mont. 1976) 
91In re Estate of Rawlins, 588 P.2d 177, 180 (Utah 1978) 
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transfer of the home in 1993, one must look at the circumstances as they existed in 1993. If 
the rule were otherwise and the rectitude of transfers were judged by future statutes, one 
might well ask if there is ever a point at which the validity of the transfer is no longer subject 
to the happenstance of future statutory changes. For example, in In re Estate of 
Gudmunsen,92 the appellant sought to invalidate the trial court's decision based on an 
amendment to the probate code that occurred after trial but while the case was on appeal. 
The appellate court properly held that the amendment could have no application.93 
Leland Stout presented an exhibit to the trial court showing the distribution of the 
estate under the 1993 laws.94 The probate assets totaled $162,664.19 while the total 
liabilities totaled $156,534.78. In addition, the LeFevre children received approximately 
$45,514.47 in distributions in the form of cash, personal property, or debt forgiveness 
following Harold's death.95 Under the laws in effect in 1993, the LeFevre children actually 
received more than what the statutes provided. There was no inequity or unjust enrichment 
warranting the imposition of a constructive trust. 
This court should hold that the substantive provisions of the 1998 amendments have 
no bearing in determining whether the 1993 transfer of the home was proper or, if the 
transfer was improper, in determining what damages flowed from the transfer. All issues 
regarding the transfer must be governed solely by the substantive provisions in effect in 
1993. The decision of the trial court to the contrary was error and should be reversed. 
92545 P.2d 146 (Mont. 1976). 
93Id. at 149. See also In re Estate of Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 349 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(amendment to probate code during the appeal did not apply to the pending case). 
94Exhibit 2 at Tab 1. The first three pages show the distribution under the 1998 
amendments, and the last two pages show the distribution under the laws in effect in 1993. 
Transcript 11/13/07 at 275. 
95Additional documentation of the proper distribution was presented in Exhibit 2, tabs 
3-15, and Exhibit 3. 
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C. Even If a Constructive Trust Were Proper, the Lefevre Children Were 
Entitled Only to the Value of the House At the Time of the Wrongful Transfer; the Trial 
Court's Decision Gave Them a Windfall Because Ellen Paid off the Mortgage. 
Even under the constructive trust theory adopted by the trial court, all the LeFevre 
children were entitled to receive was the value of Harold's estate at the time of his death. 
They "cannot expect to be placed in a better position" than if the property had been conveyed 
to them at the time of Harold's death.96 At the time of Harold's death, the home was subject 
to a trust deed; Ellen LeFevre later paid $64,144.22 to discharge the obligation, using life 
insurance proceeds which were her own funds.97 At the time of Harold's death, therefore, 
the asset was subject to a lien of at least $64,144.22. The asset actually awarded to the 
LeFevre children by the trial court, however, was free and clear of all claims. They received 
a windfall of at least $64,144.22. 
The trial court made no findings to justify awarding this windfall to the LeFevre 
children. In a case such as this seeking equitable relief, a trial court must make adequate 
findings. The "findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached."98 The few findings in this case do not meet this standard. 
There was no finding of the value of the house at the time of Harold's death. There is no 
finding concerning the amount of liens against the house. 
Even if the constructive trust theory were proper, therefore, the judgment must still 
be reversed and remanded to the trial court for determination of the amounts the LeFevre 
96Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
97Exhibit 2 Tab 1; Transcript 11/13/07 at 214. 
^Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, \ 24,112 P.3d 495, 502 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
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children should pay to reimburse Ellen's estate for the $64,144.22 and other amounts she 
paid for the benefit of the house. 
Ill: NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTED 
TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
LeFevres' claims under the oral agreement with Ellen are barred because they were 
not brought within four years from the time the agreement was allegedly breached. The 
LeFevres characterized their claim as being primarily for breach of contract." Section 78B-
2-307 of the Utah Code provides that an action "upon a contract, obligation, or liability not 
founded upon an instrument in writing" must "be brought within four years."100 Utah courts 
have held that this four-year period for bringing an action under an oral contract begins to 
run once the contract is breached.101 
Because the oral agreement was "not founded upon an instrument in writing," section 
78B-2-307 applies. The agreement was made in March 1993, following the death of Harold 
LeFevre. The trial court found the first trust agreement made in April 1993 was a breach of 
the oral agreement.102 The LeFevre children, however, did not commence their action until 
February 2005-nearly eight years after the four-year statute of limitations had lapsed. 
During the nearly twelve years from when the oral agreement was made in March 
1993 until the commencement of this action in February 2005, the LeFevre children made 
absolutely no attempt to confirm the existence of the oral agreement nor to protect any 
interests they might have had under the agreement. For example, they failed to put the 
"Record 1056: "Harold's children's main cause of action is a breach of contract." 
100Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (emphasis added). 
mSee State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1274 
(Utah CtApp. 1995). 
102Record 1179^21. 
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agreement into writing,103 they also failed to request copies of relevant documents to ensure 
that their interests were being protected, and they failed to ask for any confirmation that the 
property had been placed in a trust.104 The reason they didn't verify was they trusted Ellen105 
and they were too busy.106 
In response to the claim that this action is barred by the statute of limitations, the 
LeFevre children argued that a discovery rule should apply. The question of whether there 
exist exceptional circumstances to justify the application of a discovery rule is a question of 
law on which the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court.107 This court has 
previously held that such exceptional circumstances exist in "cases involving beneficiaries' 
claims of trustee misconduct."108 The primary claim in the instant case, however, is not of 
trustee misconduct after creation of a trust; rather, it is that an individual did not create the 
proper trust. As explained above in Point I, there was no confidential or fiduciary 
relationship. There was, therefore, no justification for holding that exceptional circumstances 
existed to justify the application of a discovery rule. 
In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court applies a balancing 
test to weigh the hardship imposed on the claimant against any prejudice to the defendant 
resulted in the passage of time.109 In this case, there is serious hardship worked on the 
defendant because the LeFevre children waited until after the death of Ellen, the only person 
103Transcript 11/13/07 at 80. 
mId. at 82. 
mId. at 80. 
mId. at 86. 
mKlinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990). 
l 08
^ow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20,111, 998 P.2d 262, 266. 
mId. 
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who had the personal knowledge necessary to directly refute Iheir claims. On the other side 
of the balance, it would have been a very simple matter for any of the LeFevre children to 
have asked for a copy of the trust documents. Based on their claim that they had a good 
relationship with Ellen, such a request would presumably have created no strain and would 
have been totally complied with. In this situation, the balance of hardships weighs against 
finding exceptional circumstances. 
Even if this is a case where a discovery rule might apply, there are insufficient 
findings to justify application of the discovery rule here. In denying Stout's motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court found that there were factual issues that precluded a ruling 
on this summary judgment issue.110 Nothing in the findings, however, resolves those factual 
disputes. The trial court did find that the LeFevre children did not receive copies of the trust, 
and that "Ellen never indicated to the LeFevre children that she had changed her mind about 
the terms of their verbal agreement." There was no finding, however, addressing the critical 
issue of whether the LeFevre children could or should have made inquiry as to the terms of 
the written trust agreement. 
For example, one of the essential terms of the oral agreement was that all debts owed 
by the children to Harold had been forgiven.111 Yet, in 1995 when Ellen made disbursements 
to the children from the sale of the rental property, she deducted the amount of those debts 
from the disbursements.112 This should have, and did, put the children on notice that Ellen 
had a different understanding of the agreement than the children, or that she did not view the 
agreement as binding. Daniel LeFevre testified that he recognized the deduction for debts 
110Record 798-96. 
mE.g., transcript 11-13-07, at page 138. 
112Transcript 11/13/07 at 147. 
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to Harold as being contrary to the oral agreement, and called Ellen to object to it.113 He did 
not, however, take any action beyond the telephone call.114 The reason he took no action was 
because he couldn't afford it at the time.115 At a minimum, this shows that the LeFevre 
children knew at least in 1995 that Ellen either had a different view of the oral agreement or 
had breached the agreement. In addition, a few years after Harold's funeral Ellen ceased to 
receive visits from the LeFevre children and stopped responding to their birthday and other 
announcements.116 These events raised a duty to inquire further and started the running of 
the statute of limitations. All that is required to impose that duty is that "through reasonable 
investigation, the plaintiff could have determined that there was reason to believe there had 
been a breach of trust."117 
This court should hold that the balance of hardships weighs against the LeFevre 
children, who were in the best position to have protected their rights. The case does not 
present exceptional circumstances justifying the application of a discovery rule. The court 
should hold the case is barred by the statute of limitations. Alternatively, the court should 
hold that the findings are inadequate to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, 
and should remand for entry of additional findings and reconsideration based on those 
findings. 
^Transcript 11-13-07 at p. 149. 
{Id.p. 156. 
'Id. at 149. 
Transcript 11/13/07 at 46-48. 
'Snow v. Rudd, 200 UT 20, % 15, 998 P.2d 262, 267-68. 
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IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONVEYING THE HOME TO 
THE LEFEVRE CHILDREN OUTRIGHT, RATHER THAN 
RETURNING THE PROPERTY TO THE PROBATE ESTATE. 
The relief sought by the LeFevre children's petition was an order setting aside the 
transfer of the home to Ellen's trust, and then dividing the probate assets among the heirs of 
Harold's estate. As explained in point II, the trial court erred in adopting a constructive trust 
theory that had not been pleaded. Contrary to the request in the petition, the Court 
transferred the property directly to the LeFevre children, rather than returning the property 
to the probate estate for distribution. 
The error is not harmless. Both parties presented substantial evidence to the trial court 
concerning the appropriate distribution of the assets of the estate. Stout presented evidence 
showing that the LeFevre children had already been paid more than they were entitled to 
receive as heirs of the probate estate. The trial court made no findings concerning this issue. 
At a minimum, therefore, the case must be remanded to the trial court for additional findings 
concerning the appropriate credits and charges against the probate estate. 
CONCLUSION 
No evidence supported the conclusion that a confidenlial relationship existed, which 
is a prerequisite to imposing a constructive trust. The judgment should be reversed with 
instructions to award judgment in favor of Leland Stout. Alternatively, the case should be 
remanded for additional findings and reconsideration in light of those findings. 
DATED this £ ^ d a y of November, 2008. 
DON R. P E T E R S E N ^ 7 ) 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, and 
RICHARD L. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Leland Stout 
24 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this z/*^ day of November, 2008. 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Kirsti H. Hansen 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
25 
APPENDIX A 
Relevant Statutes 
Statutes in effect in 1993 (date of transfer) 
§75-2-101. Intestate estate 
Any part of the estate of a decedent not 
effectively disposed of by his will passes to 
his heirs as prescribed in the following 
sections of this code. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-101, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, §3. 
Statutes in effect at time of trial 
§75-2-101. Intestate succession 
(1) Any part of a decedent's estate not 
effectively disposed of by will passes by 
intestate succession to the decedent's heirs as 
provided in this title, except as modified by 
the decedent's will. 
(2) A decedent by will may expressly 
exclude or limit the right of an individual or 
class to succeed to property of the decedent 
passing by intestate succession. If that 
individual or a member of that class survives 
the decedent, the share of the decedent's 
intestate estate to which that individual or 
class would have succeeded passes as if that 
individual or each member of that class had 
disclaimed his intestate share. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-101, enacted by L. 
1998, ch. 39, § 10. 
NOTES: 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 
1998, ch. 39, § 10 repeals former § 75-2-101, 
as enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 3, 
relating to intestate estate, and enacts the 
present section, effective July 1, 1998. 
Statutes in effect in 1993 (date of transfer) 
§ 75-2-102. Intestate share of the spouse 
The intestate share of the surviving spouse 
is the entire intestate estate unless there are 
surviving issue, one or more of whom are not 
issue of the surviving spouse, in which case 
the intestate share of the surviving spouse is 
one-half of the intestate estate. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-102, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, §3 ; 1988, ch. 110, § 1. 
Statutes in effect at time of trial 
§ 75-2-102. Intestate share of spouse 
(1) The intestate share of a decedent's 
surviving spouse is: 
(a) the entire intestate estate if: 
(i) no descendant of the decedent 
survives the decedent; or 
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving 
descendants are also descendants of the 
surviving spouse; 
(b) the first $ 50,000, plus 1/2 of any 
balance of the intestate estate, if one or more 
of the decedent's surviving descendants are 
not descendants of the surviving spouse. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b), if 
the intestate estate passes to both the 
decedent's surviving spouse and to other 
heirs, then any nonprobate transfer, as defined 
in Section 75-2-206, received by the 
surviving spouse is chargeable against the 
intestate share of the surviving spouse. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-102, enacted by L. 
1998, ch. 39, §11. 
Statutes in effect in 1993 (date of transfer) 
No analogous provision. 
The prior § 75-2-206 is quoted below. 
Current § 75-2-202(3) provides a contrary 
result from the former § 75-2-206. 
§ 75-2-206. Effect of election on benefits by 
will or statute 
A surviving spouse is entitled to homestead 
allowance, exempt property, and family 
allowance, whether or not he elects to take an 
elective share. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-206, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, §3. 
Statutes in effect at time of trial 
§ 75-2-206. Decedent's nonprobate transfers 
to the surviving spouse 
Excluding property passing to the 
surviving spouse under the federal Social 
Security system and excluded under Section 
75-2-208, the value of the augmented estate 
includes the value of the decedent's 
nonprobate transfers to the decedent's 
surviving spouse, which consist of all 
property that passed outside probate at the 
decedent's death from the decedent to the 
surviving spouse by reason of the decedent's 
death, including: 
(1) the decedent's fractional interest in 
property held as a joint tenant with the right 
of survivorship, to the extent that the 
decedent's fractional interest passed to the 
surviving spouse as surviving joint tenant; 
(2) the decedent's ownership interest in 
property or accounts held in co-ownership 
registration with the right of survivorship, to 
the extent the decedent's ownership interest 
passed to the surviving spouse as surviving 
co-owner; and 
(3) all other property that would have been 
included in the augmented estate under 
Subsection 75-2-205(1) or (2) had it passed to 
or for the benefit of a person other than the 
decedent's spouse, surviving spouse, the 
decedent, or the decedent's creditors, estate, 
or estate creditors. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-2-206, enacted by L. 
1998, ch. 39, §28. 
Statutes in effect in 1993 (date of transfer) 
Utah Code Ann. §75-8-101 (2008) 
§75-8-101. Time of taking effect-
Pro visions for transition 
(1) This code takes effect on July 1, 1977. 
(2) Except as provided elsewhere in this code, 
on the effective date of this code: 
(a) This code applies to any wills of 
decedents dying thereafter. 
(b) The code applies to any proceedings in 
court then pending or thereafter 
commenced regardless of the time of the 
death of decedent except to the extent that 
in the opinion of the court the former 
procedure should be made applicable in a 
particular case in the interest of justice or 
because of infeasibility of application of 
the procedure of this code. 
(c) Every personal representative 
including a person administering an estate 
of a minor or incompetent holding an 
appointment on that date, continues to 
hold the appointment but has only the 
powers conferred by this code and is 
subject to the duties imposed with respect 
to any act occurring or done thereafter. 
(d) An act done before the effective date 
in any proceeding and any accrued right is 
not impaired by this code. If a right is 
acquired, extinguished or barred upon the 
expiration of a prescribed period of time 
which has commenced to run by the 
provisions of any statute before the 
effective date, the provisions shall remain 
in force with respect to that right. 
(e) Any rule of construction or 
presumption provided in this code applies 
Statutes in effect at time of trial 
[same] 
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STATE DF LITAh 
UTAH COUNTY 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
KIRSTIH. HANSEN (10730) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Petitioners Hal LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel LeFevre, 
Bryce LeFevre, and Cynthia C. L. Giles 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
HAROLD ALMA LEFEVRE and 
EDITH K. LeFEVRE 
Probate No. 933400210 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court in this 
matter, amended judgment is hereby entered against Respondent and in favor of Petitioners, as 
follows: 
1. The Personal Representative's Deed from Ellen L. LeFevre as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Harold Alma LeFevre to Ellen L. LeFevre, Trustee (and to her 
Successors in trust) of the Ellen L. LeFevre Trust u/a/d April 19,1993 (found as entry number 
51236 in 1993 at the Utah County Recorder's office) is hereby set aside and declared to be void 
ab initio. 
2. Petitioners Hal LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel 
LeFevre, Bryce LeFevre, and Cynthia C. L. Giles are the lawful owners of the property located at 
2727 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah, which legal description is described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on the West property line, said point being North 776 .49 feet and 
East 904.28 feet from the West Quarter Corner of Section 30, Township 6 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°09,03" East 99.19 feet, more or less, 
to the East property line; thence South 2°39' East 247.17 feet to the State Road right of 
way line; thence South 47°38.5f West along said right of way line 129.61 feet; thence 
North 2°39' West 333.21 feet to the point of beginning. 
(the "Property"). The Property is found at serial no. 20:055:0003. 
3. Title in the Property is hereby quieted in the Petitioners. 
4. Judgment for Petitioners5 costs, in the amount of $3,212.90, is hereby entered 
against Respondent Leland Stout. 
DATED this ^ day of March 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE GARYJ3. ST( 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the Z) day of March 2008 she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to be delivered to the following: 
Richard L. Peterson 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, P.C. 
120 East 300 North Street 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Sent Via: 
Hand -Delivery 
Facsimile / facsimile A 
y Mailed (postage prepaid) I X I 
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APPENDIX C 
Amended Judgment 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
KIRSTI H. HANSEN (10730) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
4844 North 300 West, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Petitioners Hal LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel LeFevre, 
Bryce LeFevre, and Cynthia C. L. Giles 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
HAROLD ALMA LEFEVRE and 
EDITH K. LeFEVRE 
Probate No. 933400210 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THE COURT held a bench trial in the above-captioned matter on November 13, 2007 
and December 6, 2007. Petitioners were represented by Stephen Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson & 
Schmutz and Respondent was represented by Richard L. Peterson of Howard, Lewis & Peterson, 
P.C. After hearing testimony, carefully evaluating the evidence, witnesses and exhibits presented 
by each party, reviewing the parties' briefs and other pleadings, the Court makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Harold and Edith LeFevre had seven children ("LeFevre children"), who are: 
Harold R ("Hal") LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel LeFevre, 
Bryce LeFevre, and Cynthia C. L. ("Capri") Giles. 
2. Harold and Edith, as joint tenants, owned a home at 2727 North Canyon Road in 
Provo, Utah (the "Home"). 
3. Edith passed away in 1987. 
4. Harold married Ellen Stout later in 1987. 
5. Ellen had five children of her own ("Stout children"), who are: Leland Stout, 
Mary Kovarik, Jolynn Stevenson, Valerie Asvitt and Carol Wilkerson. 
6. On September 23, 1991, by virtue of Edith's death, Harold received the property. 
(Trial Ex, 1, Tab 16.) 
7. Harold and Ellen lived in the Home until Harold died on March 19, 1993. At that 
time, the Home was titled solely in Harold's name. 
8. Harold's fiineral was held five days after his death and both the LeFevre children 
and Stout children attended. 
9. Bryce LeFevre stayed at the Home while he was in Provo for the fiineral 
10. On March 24, 1993, after Harold's funeral, Ellen called the LeFevre children 
together. 
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11. The meeting was held at the Home with most of the LeFevre children present, but 
none of the Stout children present. 
12. The meeting was friendly and calm. 
13. Ellen discharged all debts that the LeFevre children owed to Harold or his estate. 
14. Ellen acknowledged to the LeFevre children that she did not own the Home and 
asked if she could continue to live in the Home until her death. 
15. Ellen also proposed that she would set up a trust for the house and her estate. At 
her death, the home and properties would be divided to the respective families. The LeFevre 
children would receive their father's home and estate and the Stout children would receive 
Ellen's property and estate. 
16. The LeFevre children that were present unanimously agreed to Ellen's above 
proposal knowing their father would have wanted Ellen to be able to stay in the Home. 
17. In addition, the LeFevre children agreed with Ellen that Hal and Leland would 
serve as successor co-trustees upon Ellen's death. 
18. The agreement was not put into writing. 
19. Months after the funeral, Hal took Ellen on a vacation with his family. 
20. On April 19, 1993, Ellen met with her attorney and created the trust. 
21. The terms of the trust were materially different than those agreed upon at the 
meeting with the LeFevre children. Instead, the trust stated that the LeFevre children and Stout 
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children would receive a 50% division of the trust estate, without regard to specific divisions of 
particular assets. 
22. The trust was also inconsistent with the verbal agreement between Ellen and the 
LeFevre children because it named Kelly LeFevre as a successor co-trustee, instead of Hal. 
23. Kelly was a high school dropout, a drug abuser and homeless. Thus, the LeFevre 
children never would have agreed to allow Kelly to represent their interests in the trust. 
24. Copies of the trust or other communication about its terms were never conveyed 
to the LeFevre children. 
25. On July 23, 1993, Ellen, as the personal representative of Harold's estate, 
transferred the Home into her trust, as agreed upon. 
26. Bryce continued to visit Ellen throughout the years and had a good relationship 
with her. 
27. On June 13, 1994, Ellen amended her trust without notifying the LeFevre 
children. She gave her own home at 830 East 2320 North in Provo, Utah to her children and 
divided the Home between the LeFevre children and her children. 
28. On September 11,1995, Lei and took Ellen to her attorney's office where she 
amended the trust, again without notifying the LeFevre children. 
29. On September 11, 1995, Leland took Ellen to her attorney and they amended the 
trust a second time without ever notifying the LeFevre children. The wording for distribution of 
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the Canyon Road house follows the first amendment with one exception. The language limits the 
distribution to the "then living child of the Trustor." Exhibit 1:8, If 6.3. This amendment from 
"beneficiary" to "child" eliminated the LeFevre children from receiving any portion of the 
Canyon Road house because they are not her "children," as defined in Article Two of the Second 
Amendment to the Ellen L. LeFevre Trust. Exhibit 1:8, Tf 1. Thus, the second amendment to the 
trust completely took the LeFevre children out of the trust as beneficiaries and gave the Home 
solely to the Stout children. 
After several years of residing in the home, Ellen gradually became reclusive and would 
not invite the LeFevre children to the home. When some of the LeFevre children came to visit 
her, she would not invite them in, but would speak to them from between the door. Leland 
helped her install mirrors, an answering machine, and a caller ID to avoid meeting or talking with 
the LeFevre children. She appeared to the LeFevre children to be losing energy to entertain 
visitors and not able to endure long talks. 
30. Ellen passed away on October 28, 2004. 
31. The Stout children never published an obituary that their mother wrote to give 
notice to the community of her passing. 
32. None of the LeFevre children were notified of her death. 
33. Ellen never indicated to the LeFevre children that she had changed her mind about 
the terms of their verbal agreement. In other words, Ellen never indicated that (1) she changed 
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the co-trustee of the trust from Hal to Kelly, and (2) she left the Home to the Stout children and 
not the LeFevre children. 
34. The Stout children intended to disadvantage the LeFevre children by never 
making any effort to notify them of Ellen's death and to exclude the LeFevre children from any 
participation in the distribution of Ellen LeFevre's estate. 
35. Leland Stout's testimony does not have any credibility regarding any issues in this 
case because: (1) his testimony about his repairs in caring for the property and Home is not 
consistent with the evidence, (2) his testimony that the LeFevre children were always demanding 
money from Ellen is not consistent with the evidence (which evidence demonstrates that the 
Stout children received the most frequent and substantial loans from Ellen), (3) of his status with 
Kelly as co-trustees of Ellen's trust, especially considering Kelly's lifestyle and Kelly's siblings' 
lack of confidence in him, (4) of the fact that Leland took Ellen to her lawyer to amend the trust 
to exclude the LeFevre children as beneficiaries of the trust, and (5) of the fact that Leland has 
not been steadily employed for a significant period of time while living off of funds he received 
from the sale of a pawn shop many years ago, and receiving support, financial and otherwise, 
from his mother, Ellen and her estate. 
36. The LeFevre children did not become aware that Ellen did not follow the 
agreement regarding the Home until after they discovered she had passed away, contacted her 
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attorney and received copies of the trust and amendments. Upon their discovery, the LeFevre 
children immediately filed the petition in this case. 
37. Steve Skabelund, Ellen's attorney, testified that in 1995 all he observed was a 
good relationship between Ellen and the LeFevre children. In fact, he was not aware of any 
contention between Ellen and the LeFevre children until this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. U.C.A. §75-8-101(2)(b) states, 
The code applies to any proceeding in court then pending or thereafter commenced 
regardless of the time of the death of decedent except to the extent that in the opinion of 
the court the former procedure should be made applicable in a particular case in the 
interest of justice or because of the infeasibility of application of the procedure of this 
code. 
2. The present probate law directs that all cases be decided under the current probate 
law unless any of the exceptions apply. 
3. The Stout children have not argued any of the exceptions; therefore, the Court 
finds that the present probate law applies. 
4. Pursuant to equity, fairness and to effect the intent of Harold and Ellen at the time 
of Harold's death, the Home belongs solely to the LeFevre children. 
5. Equity will create a trust to prevent unjust enrichment or when a confidential 
relationship is abused. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949) ("A constructive trust [is] 
an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, [and] arises by operation of law."); Renshaw 
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v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 49 P.2d 403 (Utah 1935) ("It is the confidential relationship plus the 
abuse of the confidence thus imposed, that authorizes equity to construct a trust for the benefit of 
the party whose confidence has been abused."). 
6. Ellen held a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the LeFevre children when 
they permitted her by common consent to place the Home in her trust. 
7. Ellen and the LeFevre children entered into an agreement regarding the Home, 
which agreement was that the Home would be given to the LeFevre children upon Ellen's death 
and that Hal would be the successor co-trustee of the trust. 
8. Ellen abused the confidential, fiduciary relationship with the LeFevre 
children when she (and the Stout children) changed the material terms and conditions of the 
agreement, without prior authorization and/or ratification from the LeFevre children. 
9. The changed material terms and conditions allowed the Stout children to be 
unjustly enriched by receiving the Home. 
10. Equity requires that the Home be held as an asset of a constructive trust for the 
LeFevre children. 
11. Therefore, the prior transfer of the Home for the benefit of the Stout children is set 
aside and shall become an asset of the LeFevre children from their father's estate. 
12. A judgment should be entered which gives free and clear title of the Home to the 
LeFevre children. 
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13. Except for the Home located on Canyon Road, the remaining assets shall go to the 
Stout children. 
14. Petitioners are awarded their costs, to be established by a verified memorandum of 
costs. 
15. Each party shall pay their own attorney fees. 
DATED this ^ 0 day of February 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
/ ; 
JUDGE GAR 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of February 2008 she caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be delivered to the 
following: 
Richard L. Peterson 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, P.C. 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Sen^Via: 
X^ Hand -Delivery 
Facsimile 
Mailed (postage prepaid) 
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